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Actuality Entailments, negation, and free choice inferences ∗
Sam Alxatib
CUNY GC
Abstract In some languages, (certain) root modals license Actuality Entailments
(AEs) when they are perfective-marked. We discuss two puzzling properties of
these constructions: (i) when AE-licensing modals are negated, the result entails the
negation of actuality, and (ii) when AE-licensing modals embed disjunctions, no
Free Choice inferences are available. We develop an account of (i) and show that,
given an implicature-based view of Free Choice, (ii) follows as a consequence.
Keywords: actuality entailments, free choice, modality, aspect
1 Introduction
The literature on Actuality Entailments (AEs) has mainly been concerned with
explaining their source: why is it that, in the relevant languages, perfective-marking
on a given modal implies that the possibility/obligation was actually realized? I
will have little to say about this in this paper. Instead, I focus on two facts that
have received less attention. The first is that sentences in which an AE-licensing
modal is negated give rise to what we might call an anti-AE, that is, an inference
that the relevant possibility/obligation was not realized. The second, which to my
knowledge has not been observed, is that AE-licensing modals do not permit Free
Choice inferences (FC) when they embed a disjunction. This is puzzling given that
the same modals do license FC when they take a non-AE-licensing form, e.g., under
imperfective-marking.1 The main claim of the paper is that solutions to the anti-AE
puzzle can explain the absence of FC if we adopt an “implicature”-theory of FC.
We begin with a background of AEs and a brief review of two proposals: Bhatt’s
(1999) implicative account, and Borgonovo and Cummins’s (2007) trivialization
∗ For discussion and feedback I thank Luis Alonso-Ovalle, Lucas Champollion, Masha Esipova,
Anamaria Fa˘la˘us¸, Matthew Mandelkern, Alda Mari, Andreea Nicolae, Jon Nissenbaum, Jacopo
Romoli, Wataru Uegaki, participants in Philippe Schlenker’s Fall 2015 NYU semantics seminar, and
the audience at SALT 26. I am especially grateful to Danny Fox and Philippe Schlenker for many
helpful and thought-provoking discussions about this material. I also thank Guillaume Thomas for
French judgements, and Suzi Lima, Juliana Magro, Rafael Nonato, and Livia Camargo Souza for
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1 A related finding, reported in Bhatt 2006, is that Hindi Free Choice Items (FCIs) are licensed under
IMP-marked modals but not under PFV-marked ones (Bhatt 2006: 172).
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account. We focus on these analyses early on because they provide simple ways
of capturing AEs and anti-AEs (section 2). We then look at challenges to the two
views, and in section 3 consider two others: Hacquard’s (2009) and Homer’s (2011).
These, I will argue, do not account for anti-AEs, but I will propose a (stipulative)
reinterpretation of Homer’s aspect-shift story that does. In section 4 we turn to
FC data and show how the revision correctly predicts absence of FC inferences for
(anti-)AE-licensing modals. Section 5 concludes.
2 AEs and anti-AEs
2.1 Background and two accounts
The first report of Actuality Entailments came in Bhatt 1999, who noticed that in
Hindi (among several other languages) perfective-marked (PFV) ability modals imply
that the ability was realized, while imperfective-marked (IMP) ability modals do not.
The PFV/IMP asymmetry is shown below in Hindi (1) and Greek (2): PFV-ability
(but not IMP-ability) is intuitively contradicted by subsequent denial of actuality.
(1) a. Iti
Iti
vimaan
airplane
ur.aa
fly
sak-aa
able-PFV
(#lekin
(#but
us-ne
he-erg
vimaan
air-ship
nahı˜ı˜
NEG
ur.aa-yaa)
fly-PFV)
‘Iti could fly the airplane, but he didn’t fly the airplane.’
b. Iti
Iti
vimaan
airplane
ur.aa
fly
sak-taa
able-IMP
thaa
was
(lekin
(but
vo
he
vimaan
airplane
nahı˜ı˜
NEG
ur.aa-taa
fly-IMP
thaa)
was)
‘Iti is/was able to fly airplanes but he doesn’t/didn’t fly airplanes.’
(2) a. Boresa
able.PAST.PFV.1sg
na
NA
tu
him
miliso
talk-PFV.1sg
(#ala
(#but
Den
NEG
tu
him
milisa)
talk.pst-PFV
‘I could talk to him, but I didn’t’
b. Borusa
able.PAST.IMP.1sg
na
NA
sikoso
lift-PFV.1sg
afto
this
to
the
trapezi
table
ala
but
Den
NEG
to
it
sikosa
lift-PFV
‘I could lift this table, but I didn’t’
Bhatt’s conclusion from these data was that ability verbs do not in fact make modal
assertions of their own. Their meaning is similar to that of the implicative verb
manage: like manage, ability verbs are assertorically equivalent to the VPs that they
embed, but they are defined only if those VPs denote activities that require effort
(Karttunen 1971; Karttunen & Peters 1979). Because “able-to-X” makes the same
assertion as X (where X requires effort), “PFV-able-to-X” will assert PFV-X , which
is the AE. But then why do AEs disappear under IMP-marking? Bhatt’s answer
is that IMP-marking brings non-actual generic semantics of its own, and it is this
genericity that situates the (implicative) predicate in non-actual possible worlds.
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Later work (e.g., Borgonovo & Cummins 2007; Hacquard 2009) showed that
AEs are not limited to verbs of ability, and are licensed by root modals of varying
flavors and quantificational force. Below we show examples from French, and also
from Brazilian Portuguese (BP) where both the existential modal poder, and the
universal modal ter que, are unambiguously deontic.2
(3) Jane
Jane
(#a pu)/(Xpouvait)
can.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
aller
go
chez
house
sa
her
tante
aunt
(selon
(per
les
the
ordres
orders
de
of
son
her
père),
father),
mais
but
n’y
NE’there
est
has
pas
NEG
allée.
gone
‘Per her father’s orders, Jane could go to her aunt’s house, but didn’t’
(4) Pour
To
aller
go
à
to
Londres,
London,
Jane
Jane
(#a dû)/(Xdevait)
had.to.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
prendre
take
le
the
train,
train,
mais
but
elle
she
a
has
pris
taken
l’avion
the’plane
“To go to London, Jane had to take the train, but she took the plane”
(5) Ele
He
(#pôde)/(Xpodia)
can.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
visitar
visit
seu
his
amigo,
friend,
mas
but
ele
he
não
NEG
o
him
visitou
visit.PFV
(6) Ele
He
(#teve)/(Xtinha) que
had.to.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
ir
go
no
to-the
dentista,
dentist,
mas
but
ele
he
não
NEG
foi
go.PFV
As AEs appear to be licensed by modals of different flavors and force (with the
exception of epistemic modals – not shown), we will hereafter use the symbols ♦ˇ/ˇ
to refer to modals that license AEs, and the familiar ♦/ to refer to those that do
not. For our concerns the two symbol pairs correspond mostly (though not totally)
to PFV- and IMP-marked modals. I should note that I will also use ♦/ to write
metalinguistic modal conditions. I will disambiguate the notation where needed.
In light of data like (3-6), Borgonovo and Cummins (B&C) proposed that AE-
licensers have the same modal semantics as their non-AE-licensing counterparts.
The difference is that the former operate on ‘trivialized’ modal bases, i.e., modal
bases that consist solely of the evaluation world. This, as shown below, makes an
AE-licenser equivalent to its propositional argument (♦/ are metalinguistic here):
(7) a. ♦ˇ(p)=1 iff ♦{w}(p)=1
=1 iff p(w)=1
b. ˇ(p)=1 iff {w}(p)=1
=1 iff p(w)=1
2 The BP judgements vary: some speakers do not agree that PFV-marked poder/ter que license AEs.
This, however, is not the main concern of the paper. We are interested in the connection between
AEs, anti-AEs, and FC. As far as I can see, speakers who agree with the AE-judgements also agree
with the anti-AE judgements (shown in section 2.2), and agree that FC inferences are absent (section
4); speakers who disagree on AEs seem to simultaneously disagree with the anti-AE/FC judgements.
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2.2 Anti-AEs
The equivalence in (7a-b) produces one important similarity between B&C’s theory
and Bhatt’s implicative analysis. Not only are AEs predicted in positive uses; their
negations, ‘anti-AEs’, are predicted in negative uses. And indeed the prediction is
confirmed: negating ♦ˇp/ˇp quite strongly implies that p did not take place.
(8) a. Alors qu’
while
il
he
(#n’a pas pu)/(Xne pouvait pas)
(#NEG can.PFV)/(XNEG can.IMP)
rendre visite à
visit
son
his
ami,
friend,
il
he
lui
him
a rendu visite
visited
b. Les
the
Alliés
Allies
(#n’ont pas dû)/(Xne devaient pas)
(#NEG had.to.PFV)/(XNEG had.to.IMP)
bombarder
bomb
Nagasaki
Nagasaki
(9) a. Ele
He
não
NEG
(#pôde)/(Xpodia)
can.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
visitar
visit
seu
his
amigo,
friend,
mas
but
ele
he
visitou
visited
ele
him
b. Ele
He
não
NEG
(#teve)/(Xtinha)
had.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
que
to
ir
go
no
to-the
dentista,
dentist,
mas
but
ele
he
foi
went
Note that the equivalence between ♦ˇ/ˇp and p does not predict anti-AEs only
when ♦ˇp/ˇp are overtly negated, but in all cases where the semantics requires
their falsity. This prediction is confirmed as well: in (10-11) the BP particle só
‘only’ embeds ♦ˇ/ˇ, but its exclusive component produces anti-AEs for the salient
contextual alternatives; and in (12-13) the verb duvidar ‘doubt’ entails believing
¬p when it embeds ♦ˇ/ˇp, but not when it embeds ♦p/p:
(10) Só
only
a Lu
Lu
pôde
can-PFV
comer
eat
torta,
cake,
#mas
#but
a Pri
Pri
comeu
ate
torta
cake
também
also
(11) Só
only
a Lu
Lu
teve que
had.to-PFV
fazer
do
a
the
prova,
test,
#mas
#but
a Pri
Pri
fez
did
a
the
prova
test
também
also
(12) Ele
He
foi
went
na
to.the
festa,
party,
mas
but
eu
I
duvido
doubt
que
that
ele
he
(#pôde)/(Xpodia)
can.(#PFV)/(XIMP)
ir
go
(13) Ele
He
fez
did
a
the
prova,
test,
mas
but
eu
I
duvido
doubt
que
that
ele
he
(#teve)/(Xtinha)
(#PFV)/(XIMP)
que
to
fazer
do
Our findings so far may be summarized as follows (in (15), ♦/ are non-AE-
licensing modal expressions).
(14) a. ♦ˇ/ˇp  p
b. ¬♦ˇ/ˇp  ¬p
(15) a. ♦/p 2 p
b. ¬♦/p 2 ¬p
454
AEs, negation, and FC inferences
2.3 Challenges to Bhatt and Borgonovo and Cummins
The fact that non-abilitative modals also license AEs (in addition to ability modals)
appears to present a serious challenge to Bhatt, since his implicative analysis is
intended for ability verbs only. Can this mean that all AE-licensers, e.g., the French
pouvoir, are implicative? The answer is most likely no, for at least two reasons. First,
assigning pouvoir an implicative meaning will necessarily apply to its epistemic
use, and this is undesirable given that epistemic modals never license AEs, regardless
of aspect.3 Second, the analysis would effectively collapse the existential/universal
distinction between AE-licensers, because under IMP-marking both ♦p and p
are predicted to have generic truth conditions, along the lines of GEN(p). From
this it follows that conjunctions like ♦p∧♦¬p and p∧¬p will both mean
GEN(p)∧GEN(¬p), and if GEN is treated as a universal-like quantifier, then ♦p∧
♦¬p will incorrectly come out inconsistent, and if GEN is treated as an existential-
like quantifier, p∧¬p will incorrectly come out consistent.
Quantificational force also presents a challenge to B&C. By trivializing the
modal base, B&C predict that existential and universal AE-licensers make identical
assertions, and when one is judged true, the other should be as well. This is falsified
by the French (16) and the BP (17): ♦ˇp&♦¬p is consistent; ˇp&♦¬p is not.
(16) a. Il
He
a pu
can.PFV
prendre
take
le
the
train,
train,
(Xmais
(Xbut
il
he
aurait
have.cond.PAST
aussi
also
pu
can
ne
NE
pas
NEG
le
it
prendre).
take.
“He could take the train, but he could have also not taken it”
b. Il
He
a dû
must.PFV
prendre
take
le
the
train,
train,
(#mais
(#but
il
he
aurait
have.cond.PAST
aussi
also
pu
can
ne
NE
pas
NEG
le
it
prendre).
take.
“He had to take the train, but he could have also not taken it”4
(17) a. Ele
He
pôde
can.PFV
viajar,
travel,
(Xmas
(Xbut
também
also
podia
can.IMP
não
NEG
ter
have
viajado).
traveled)
“He could travel, but could have also not travelled”
b. Ele
He
teve que
had.to.PFV
viajar,
travel,
(#mas
(#but
também
also
podia
can.IMP
não
NEG
ter
have
viajado).
traveled)
What (16-17) teach us is that, by generating inferences about the evaluation world,
3 See B&C and Hacquard for proposals about PFV-epistemic modals, and also footnote 7.
4 Judgements due to Guillaume Thomas (p.c.).
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the AE-licensers ♦ˇ/ˇ do not lose the modality exhibited by their non-AE counter-
parts.5 We may therefore update (14a), from our data summary, to (14′a) below.6
(14′) a. ♦ˇ/ˇp  p, ♦/p
b. ¬♦ˇ/ˇp  ¬p
(15) a. ♦/p 2 p
b. ¬♦/p 2 ¬p
We will now move away from the implicative and the trivialization accounts. As
we saw, both analyses correctly handle the negation data, but seem to fall short of
preserving the modal semantics of ♦ˇ/ˇ. When we turn our attention to alternatives
that solve this problem, we will want to ensure that they can also account for anti-AE.
I will argue that Hacquard’s proposal cannot, and that a revision to Homer’s can. I
do not claim this as support for Homer’s proposal, since admittedly the revision I
will offer is stipulative. Rather, my goal is to find a way of capturing anti-AEs that
retains modality, and test it against the FC data that we will see later.
One more note before we move on: if deontic ♦ˇ/ˇ express permission/obligation
along with actuality, then clearly AEs can be truth-conditionally independent of the
semantics associated with the licensing modal; permission/obligation does not by
itself imply the content of the AE, and the AE does not imply either permission or
obligation. This independence will form the basis of my argument against Hacquard.
3 Hacquard’s and Homer’s proposals
3.1 Hacquard (2009) and event similarity
Like B&C, Hacquard adopts Kratzer’s treatment of modals, but unlike B&C, she
assumes no difference in modal base between PFV- and IMP-marked modals. The key
difference, she proposes, is that PFV introduces its event variable in the evaluation
world, while IMP, owing to its generic meaning, introduces event variables in non-
actual worlds. This is summarized below (I ignore tense/viewpoint details here):
(18) a. JPFV VPKw0 = 1 iff ∃e(e is in w0 and JVPKw0(e)=1)
b. JIMP VPKw0 = 1 iff GENw0([λw′ . ∃e(e is in w′ and JVPKw′(e)=1)])
5 These findings are contrary to Bhatt, who claimed that PFV-ability does not contribute any claim
about ability. I do not review Bhatt’s argument here. For details, see Bhatt (1999) section 5.3 and
Hacquard section 4.2. Note that some of Hacquard’s critique uses similar examples to (16-17) above.
6 The reader may wonder what happens to the modality of ♦ˇ/ˇp under negation, i.e., whether there
are data that suggest an update to (14′b). I do not yet have a clear answer to this question. My
investigation of BP has revealed similar results to Hacquard’s French findings: ¬♦ˇp implies ¬♦p,
but the inference is cancellable (see Hacquard section 4.1). But surprisingly, the parallel inference
from ¬ˇp to ¬p does not appear to be equally cancellable, and I do not know why ˇ and ♦ˇ should
differ in this way. Since the issue does not affect the focus of this paper, I leave it for future work.
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The next important detail is that root modals are interpreted below aspect heads. This
means that PFV-marked root modals will have truth conditions that assign non-actual
descriptions to actual events, while for IMP-marked modals the truth conditions will
be about generic (thus non-actual) events. So, given a root modal ♦,
(19) a. JPFV ♦-VPKw0 = 1 iff ∃e(e is in w0 and J♦-VPKw0(e)=1)
= 1 iff ∃e(e is in w0 and ∃w′(w0Rw′ & JVPKw′(e)=1))
b. JIMP ♦-VPKw0 = 1 iff GENw0([λw′ . ∃e(e is in w′ and J♦-VPKw′(e)=1)])
(In this review of Hacquard I am suspending the notation I introduced earlier: ♦
above stands for a modal lexical root/stem). How does this matter for AEs? Hacquard
conjectures that events in a world w that have possible descriptions, descriptions
in worlds accessible from w, inherit those descriptions in w. This is stated in her
Preservation of Event Descriptions principle:
(20) The Preservation of Event Descriptions principle (PED):
For any two worlds w1,w2, event e, and property of events P, if e exists in
w1 and w1Rw2, then if P(w2)(e)=1 then P(w1)(e)=1.
The PED alone does not yet distinguish between PFV- and IMP-modals. A needed
auxiliary assumption, implicit in Hacquard, is that the domain of eventualities is
world-dependent: an event e may exist in w′ (be in the domain of w′) without existing
w, even if w′ is accessible from w. With this assumption and the PED in place, the
following difference emerges: PFV-♦/p asserts the existence of an event e in w0,
which has ♦/p as its description in w0, and p as its description in some/all worlds
accessible from w0 (as in (19a)). By the PED this makes e a p-event in w0, and the
AE results. IMP-♦/p, on the other hand, asserts the existence of ♦/p-events in
generic worlds, not in w0. Because the existence of these events in accessible worlds
does not entail their existence in w0, no implications about actuality follow.7
This, as I understand it, is the core of Hacquard’s analysis. Let us see what it
predicts about anti-AEs. Since PFV-♦p asserts the existence of an actual ♦p event,
¬PFV-♦p should be true in w0 iff there are no ♦p events in w0, i.e., if no event in w0
is p in any accessible worlds. Now, if w0 is itself accessible, then of course there
cannot be any p events in w0. So, whenever the accessibility relation is reflexive,
as in abilitative/circumstantial modality, ¬PFV-♦p entails the anti-AE ¬p. But
this prediction changes when we consider deontic modality, where accessibility is
nonreflexive: the laws in w0 are not necessarily true in w0, so w0 is not deontically-
accessible from itself. There is therefore no consequence from ¬PFV-♦p on whether
w0 contains any p-events, hence no anti-AEs. Similar problems arise for ¬PFV-p.
7 The difference is in some sense scopal: the lexical semantics of IMP is such that modal displacement
‘outscopes’ event introduction. A similar relation blocks AEs for PFV-epistemic modals, but its origin
is syntactic: epistemic modality takes obligatory wide-scope and thus outscopes event introduction.
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3.2 AEs as aspect-shift
The connection between aspect-shift and AEs is discussed in detail in Mari & Martin
2007 and Homer 2011. I cannot offer a comprehensive review of the supporting
data here, so I will note two general findings. First, AEs are not specific to modal
auxiliaries. As Homer notes, the French verb coûter, ‘to cost’, gives rise to an
AE-like inference when it is PFV-marked, meaning ‘cost X and sold for X’. Second,
there are cases where AEs are suspended, and replaced with inchoative readings, and
with ‘complexive’ readings. The readings appear to be triggered by certain adverbs,
and they arise not just for root modals but for other stative predicates as well: in (21),
the stative predicate être en colère, ‘be angry’, takes the meaning become angry
when it co-occurs with the adverb soudain, ‘suddenly’. And the same (AE-less)
inchoative reading results from combining PFV-pouvoir with soudain (22):
(21) Jean
Jean
a soudain
suddenly
été
was.PFV
en colère
angry
cet
this
après-midi
afternoon
‘Jean suddenly became angry this afternoon’
(22) J
J
a soudain
suddenly
pu
able.PFV
soulever
lift
un
a
frigo,
fridge,
Xmais
Xbut
ne l’a pas fait
didn’t do it
‘J suddenly acquired the ability to lift a fridge, but didn’t’
Similarly, combining statives with the adverb a plusieurs reprises, ‘on several
occasions’, produces what Homer calls ‘complexive’ readings (see also Bary 2009).
These are re-interpretations of states as maximal episodes that verify the relevant
state. The complexive reading is shown for the stative être assis in (23), and in
parallel for PFV-pouvoir when it is modified by a plusieurs reprises (24):
(23) Aujourd’hui
Today
Jean
J
a été
was.PFV
assis
seated
à
on
plusieurs
several
reprises
occasions
(24) À
on
plusieurs
several
reprises
occasions
J.
J.
a pu
able.PFV
soulever
lift
un
a
frigo,
fridge,
mais
but
ne l’a pas fait
didn’t do it
‘On several occasions J. had the ability to lift the fridge, but didn’t’
Because of this apparent competition between AEs and other shifted readings of
statives, Homer proposed that AEs result from a process of aspect-coercion, triggered
in these cases by combining PFV (which requires bounded event predicates) with
statives (which are unbounded). It isn’t obvious why AEs should ever serve as a
repair to the otherwise problematic PFV+state configurations, given that the grammar
makes other repairs available. Moreover, it is not obvious what factors determine
the choice of one repair mechanism over another.8 Whether different lexical items
8 In Palestinian Arabic, environments that produce inchoative readings for statives seem to uniformly
produce AEs for the ability root. See Alxatib To appear for details.
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are associated with different coercion operators, or whether context and information
structure play a role, remains to be worked out. For now I want to show how Homer
uses his syntactic operator ACT to implement the AE coercion mechanism. The
operator occurs just below the PFV head, and conjoins its modal argument with the
VP embedded in it. This effectively generates the meaning ♦p & p.9
(25) JACT [♦-VP]Kw = [λev .JVPKw(e)=1 & ∃e′(J♦-VPKw(e′)=1&τ(e)=τ(e′))]
The important detail for us in (25) is that it is conjunctive. If a sentence contains a
negated AE-licenser, its truth conditions will be satisfied if either of the modal/actual
claims is false. Anti-AEs are therefore not predicted by the definition of ACT in (25).
In the next section I offer a revision of (25) that captures both AEs and anti-AEs.
3.3 Aspect-coercion revised: AE-licensers as derived implicative predicates
My proposal bears some resemblance to Bhatt’s implicative analysis, but it does not
identify any AE-licenser as an implicative verb itself. Instead, the implicativity—the
assertoric equivalence between the licensing modal and the VP below it—is mediated
by the revised ACT. The output of ACT, I propose, is roughly the meaning of the VP
embedded under the modal. But ACT also adds a requirement (underlined below)
that its verifying event accompany a state of the relevant modality:
(26) JACT [♦-VP]Kw
= [λev : JVPKw(e)=1→∃e′(t(e)vt(e′)&J♦-VPKw(e′)=1) .JVPKw(e)=1]
Both AEs and anti-AEs result from the revised entry in (26), because the semantics of
[ACT [modal VP]] is assertorically identical to the semantics of VP. The difference
is that the former is defined only for events that fall within a state that satisfies the
provided modal description. Notice that, while (26) produces the anti-AE under
negation, it does not negate (or assert) the modal claim. This is desirable in the case
of existential root modals (see footnote 6), but too weak given the puzzling behavior
of universal modals. I leave this detail for future work.
The effect of (26) can be written in simple terms as in (27a), where by ♦ˇ/ˇ we
mean the ACT-♦/ combination. The AE/anti-AE products are shown in (27b).
(27) a. ♦ˇ/ˇp is defined only if p→ ♦/p. If defined, then ♦ˇ/ˇp = p
b. If ♦ˇ/ˇp is defined, then p→ ♦/p;
if ♦ˇ/ˇp is true, then p and ♦/p; if ♦ˇ/ˇp is false, then ¬p.
9 The syncategorematic (25) is a gross simplification of Homer’s. In the original (compositional)
entry, ACT is assumed to accompany an unpronounced VP-“pronoun”, which (in AE examples) is
coindexed with the embedded VP. ACT generates the AE by conjoining the pronoun with the modal
VP. Also, Homer’s ACT delivers a bounded event predicate, a crucial detail given that unboundedness
is what causes stative-PFV conflict, and triggers coercion. I skip these details for ease of presentation.
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4 AEs and Free Choice disjunctions
We now turn to FC disjunctions and their interaction with AEs. After a brief review
of FC disjunctions, we will see a difference between AE- and non-AE-licensing
modals: the former do not license FC inferences when they embed disjunctions; the
latter do. Once we discuss the data in detail, we will look at implicature-accounts of
FC, and later apply them to constructions of the form ♦ˇ/ˇ(p∨q). We will show
that the data are handled correctly by combining the derived-implicative analysis
developed in the previous section, together with an implicature theory of FC.
It is well-known that when a disjunction is embedded under a possibility modal,
e.g., a modal of permission, the sentence is intuitively understood to imply possibility
(or permission) for each disjunct.
(28) John is allowed to eat cake or ice cream
Inference: John is allowed to eat cake and John is allowed to eat ice cream
FC inferences are puzzling if we assume (as is standard) that a disjunction p∨ q
is verified by the truth of just one of p,q. This leads us to expect (28) to be true
in a scenario where John is allowed to eat cake but not ice cream (♦p&¬♦q),
because ♦p alone entails ♦(p∨ q). The question, then, is why in these linguistic
environments the individual disjuncts are intuitively ‘distributed’, that is, understood
to each be possible in the relevant sense (e.g., permitted, epistemically possible, etc).
Note that FC is also implied by constructions of the form (p∨q), e.g., (29):
(29) John needs to talk to Mary or Sue
Inference: John is allowed to talk to Mary and John is allowed to talk to Sue
While the obligation expressed in (29) is true in situations where John needs to
talk to Mary (p), the sentence intuitively implies that John has a choice. But in
this case there is a likely straightforward explanation for FC:10 having failed to
say ‘John needs to talk to Mary’ (p), the (presumably) opinionated speaker must
believe that John does not in fact need to speak to Mary (¬p). It is therefore
possible for him not to (♦¬p). Similarly, by not saying ‘John needs to talk to Sue’
the speaker must believe that John does not need to speak to Sue, and it follows that
♦¬q. These two inferences, together with the utterance (p∨q), imply that John
needs to speak to one of Mary/Sue, but is allowed to speak to Mary and allowed to
speak to Sue (♦p&♦q). Note, importantly, that these steps cannot be used to derive
FC for ♦(p∨q), e.g., (28), because in that case negating the alternatives ♦p and ♦q
contradicts the utterance. We will return to an analysis of ♦(p∨q) in section 4.2.
10 See Sauerland 2004.
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4.1 Data
In BP, FC inferences arise when poder/ter que are IMP-marked, as shown in (30),
but not when they are PFV-marked, (31):
(30) Ele
he
podia/tinha que
could/had-to.IMP
aprender
learn
Inglês
English
ou
or
Alemão.
German.
XEntão
XTherefore
ele
he
podia
could.IMP
aprender
learn
Inglês,
English,
e
and
ele
he
podia
could.IMP
aprender
learn
Alemão.
German
‘He could/had-to learn English or German. Therefore he had permission to
learn English, and he had permission to learn German’
(31) Ele
he
pôde/teve que
could/had-to.PFV
aprender
learn
Inglês
English
ou
or
Alemão.
German.
#Então
#Therefore
ele
he
podia
could.IMP
aprender
learn
Inglês,
English,
e
and
ele
he
podia
could.IMP
aprender
learn
Alemão.
German
These data require some clarification. First, in (31) the intended (and reportedly
faulty) inference is from a PFV-marked premise to an IMP-marked conclusion. The
reader may wonder why we do not compare the valid IMP-to-IMP discourse in (30)
to a PFV-to-PFV analog, instead of the PFV-to-IMP instance in (31). The reason is
that (31) tests whether the PFV premise licenses a conclusion of FC permission.
If we were to change it to include a PFV-marked conclusion, the result would test
whether the premise leads to a conclusion of actuality.
Second, the correlation that we are interested in is not between PFV-marking
and the availability of FC. Rather, it is between AE-licensing and FC. This is an
important difference, because there are PFV-marked modal constructions that do
not license AEs, e.g., PFV-marked epistemic modals, and expressions like “have
permission to VP”. As it turns out, these non-AE-licensers do give rise to FC when
they embed disjunctions. I show BP examples of the latter kind below:11
(32) Ele
He
teve
had.PFV
permissão
permission
pra
to
visitar
visit
a Ana,
Ana,
Xmas
Xbut
ele
he
não
NEG
visitou
visited
ela
her
‘He had permission to visit João, but he didn’t visit him’ (no AE)
(33) Ele
He
teve
had.PFV
permissão
permission
pra
to
visitar
visit
a Lu
Lu
ou
or
a Ana.
Ana,
XEntão
XTherefore
ele
he
teve
had.PFV
permissão
permission
pra
to
visitar
visit
o L,
L,
e
and
ele
he
teve
had.PFV
permissão
permission
pra
to
visitar
visit
a A.
A
‘He had permission to visit Lu or Ana. Therefore he had permission to visit
L, and he had permission to visit A’ (XFC)
11 I thank an anonymous SALT abstract reviewer for asking about this.
461
Alxatib
There is, of course, an important challenge to the aspect-shift view here: if ter
permissão is stative, why does shifting it under PFV-marking not generate AEs?
Perhaps the verb ter (‘have’) undergoes different kinds of shifts from the expressions
poder/ter que. But in any case the question is not of direct concern to us. The
important point is that AE-licensing, not PFV-marking, is the relevant FC blocker.12
Third, though ♦ˇ/ˇ block FC inferences, they seem to be compatible with FC
scenarios. Sentence (34), taken from (31) above, can be uttered if the speaker knows
that João had a choice between English/German, but learned just one of the two.
(34) O João
João
teve que
had-to.PFV
aprender
learn
Inglês
English
ou
or
Alemão
German
The compatibility of (34) with FC is significant, because it shows that disjunction
takes scopes below the AE-modal. It may not seem necessary to look for evidence
for this, given that the scopal relation is reflected in the surface form, but we must
take note of the logical possibility that in (34), there is a deleted occurrence of ˇ in
the second disjunct. If so, the sentence would underlyingly be a plain disjunction,
and thus would (arguably) not generate FC. But if this is right, then (34) would mean
that p (or q) was realized and required, which makes (34) false in FC scenarios,
where neither p nor q is by itself a necessity. In other words, if disjunction took scope
above ˇ, then (34) should not only block FC, but should also imply its negation.
We now come to our final summary of the data: AE-licensers generate AEs, and
their negations generate anti-AEs. When they embed disjunctions, AE-licensers do
not generate FC inferences but seem compatible with FC:
(35) a. ♦ˇ/ˇp  p, ♦/p
b. ¬♦ˇ/ˇp  ¬p
c. ♦ˇ/ˇ(p∨q) 2 FC
2 ¬FC
(36) a. ♦/p 2 p
b. ¬♦/p 2 ¬p
c. ♦/(p∨q)  FC
In the next two sections we show how (35a,b), which result from the ‘derived-
implicative’ analysis (section 3.3), conspire to predict (35c) under an implicature-
based theory of FC. The proposal effectively makes ♦ˇ/ˇ(p∨q) behave as if it were
an unembedded disjunction as far as the FC-algorithm is concerned. This, we will
see, is the reason why ♦ˇ/ˇ(p∨q) does not generate FC, while ♦/(p∨q) does.
4.2 FC as an implicature: Recursive exhaustification
In this section we outline the basics of Fox’s (2007) recursive exhaustification
account of FC. Because of space I will not be able to discuss the differences between
12 For more discussion of the have permission/ability family of constructions, see Homer section 5.4.
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Fox’s (grammatical) theory and its (non-grammatical) precursors in, e.g., Kratzer &
Shimoyama 2002 and Alonso-Ovalle 2006.13 Readers familiar with this literature,
specifically with Fox 2007, may proceed directly to section 4.3.
Crucial to the implicature-view of FC is the distributional similarity between
FC inferences and scalar implicatures (SIs). Both types of inference are typically
available in upward monotone environments, but are significantly weakened (or
blocked) in downward monotone ones. For example, while (37) implies that John
did not finish writing his paper, its negation in (38) does not intuitively include a
negation of finishing the paper.
(37) John started writing his SALT paper  start & ¬finish
(38) John did not start writing his SALT paper  ¬start
6 ¬(start&¬finish)
Similarly, (39) implies FC, but its negation (40) appears to be stronger than merely
negating the conjunctive FC; it implies that neither cake nor ice cream is permitted.14
(39) John is allowed to eat cake or ice cream  ♦cake & ♦ice-cream
(40) John is not allowed to eat cake or ice cream  ¬♦(cake∨ ice-cream)
6 ¬(♦cake & ♦ice-cream)
The same difference appears in the case of disjunction-embedding universal modals:
(41) John needs to talk to Mary or Sue  (m∨ s) & ♦m & ♦s
(42) John does not need to talk to Mary or Sue  ¬(m∨ s)
6 ¬((m∨ s) & ♦m & ♦s)
On the standard (neo-)Gricean view, the inference from start to ¬finish in (37)
comes from a form of counterfactual reasoning that listeners are assumed to engage
in. In (37), the listener attributes to her speaker the belief that the finish-alternative,
John finished writing his SALT paper, is relevant, and assumes that the speaker is
committed to providing all of the information that they could on the matter. If—the
listener reasons—the finish-alternative were believed true by the (informative and
honest) speaker, they would have uttered it in place of (37). So, having uttered (37)
instead, it follows that the speaker is in no position to communicate the content of
the finish-sentence. The listener thus concludes that the speaker believes that John
did not finish the paper.15
13 For discussion, see Fox 2007, Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012, and Schlenker 2016.
14 These illustrations are intended without prosodic prominence on or or start, though note that
accenting the scalar items seems to change the judgements in parallel: accenting or in (40) can be
understood to negate FC, and accenting start in (38) can suggest that John finished the paper.
15 Note that the same reasoning does not apply to the negated (38), because its alternative John did not
finish his paper is weaker (i.e., less informative) than the utterance.
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On the grammatical theory of implicatures, as formulated in Fox, SIs are gen-
erated by an unpronounced exhaustification operator, hereafter Exh, which takes
a clausal argument and asserts it together with the negation of its excludable al-
ternatives. The semantics of Exh, as the reader may have noted, is a lot like that
of the particle only, though the operators do differ in at least one respect: Exh
asserts its propositional argument, while only arguably presupposes it.16 When Exh
is applied to a case like (37), it asserts the sentence and adds the negation of its
finish-alternative, but when applied to (38), Exh does nothing; the only available
alternative is the negation of the finish alternative, and because this alternative is
weaker than (38), it is not excludable (we will say more about excludability shortly).
Note that, if Exh is free to appear at any syntactic level, we expect a representa-
tion of (38) where Exh appears under negation. The resulting reading in this case
is the unattested reading shown earlier: that it is false that John started but did not
finish his paper, i.e., that either John did not start the paper, or he started and finished
it. Because the reading does not seem to be available with unmarked intonation, the
grammatical theory of SIs has to include a principle that keeps Exh from appearing
under negation (more generally in DE contexts), or at least explain the apparent
preference for parses where Exh is absent from DE environments. To this end, Chier-
chia et al. (2012) propose that the preference is driven by a preference for stronger
readings: since Exh strengthens the meaning of its complement, strengthening under
a DE operator results in weakened truth conditions above the operator. Parses where
Exh is absent are therefore stronger in these cases, and hence preferred.17
Being a syntactic operator, Exh may take as its argument a “pre-exhaustified”
clause, i.e., a clause that already contains an occurrence of Exh. We will now see
how iterated exhaustification produces ♦p&♦q (i.e., FC) when applied to ♦(p∨q),
but does not produce p&q when applied to p∨q, nor FC for ♦ˇ(p∨q).
We assume that the set of alternatives to a sentence S contains sentences that
result from replacing the scalar items in S with their alternatives. The alternatives to
a disjunction p∨q are the disjuncts p and q and the conjunction p∧q. Let S be of
the form ♦(p∨q). Then the alternatives to S are the sentences shown in set A below:
(43) A = {♦p,♦q,♦(p∧q)}
We write ExhA(S) to mean the result of exhaustifying S with respect to the alterna-
tives in A. Exhaustifying with respect to a set of alternatives A, on Fox’s proposal, is
not equated with negating all of the elements that appear in A. Rather, Exh negates
only those elements of A that are ‘Innocently-Excludable’ (IE) with respect to S:
(44) ExhA(S) = S &
∧{¬S′ : S′∈ IEA(S)}
16 For a review of semantic analyses of only, see Ippolito 2008 and Beaver & Clark 2008.
17 Though see Magri 2011 for a revision.
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Before we see what it means to be Innocently-Excludable, let us quickly introduce the
term “set-negation”: the set-negation of a set of sentences B, B¬, is the conjunction
of negating all of B’s members:
(45) Given a set of sentences B, the ‘set negation’ of B, B¬, is defined as follows:
B¬ =
∧{¬S′ : S′∈B}
Now to IE. To start, observe that the set-negation of A, i.e., negating all of the
elements of A, contradicts S; S says that one of p,q is permitted, but negating the
members of A amounts to saying that p is not permitted, q is not permitted, and p
and q together are not permitted. But on a closer look, we find that this contradiction
has a narrower origin; while it is true that A’s set-negation contradicts S, there is a
proper subset of A whose set-negation also contradicts S, namely {♦p,♦q}. Call
this set A2. Unlike A, A2 has no proper subsets whose set-negation contradicts S, so
we can call A2 non-innocent: a set of sentences B is non-innocent w.r.t. sentence
S iff B’s set-negation contradicts S, and there is no proper subset C of B whose
set-negation contradicts S:
(46) B is non-innocent w.r.t. S iff B¬  ¬S and ¬∃C(C⊂B & C¬  ¬S)
We now say that IEA(S) is A, minus the non-innocent sets (w.r.t. S) that it contains:
(47) IEA(S) = A−⋃{B : B⊆A and B is non-innocent w.r.t. S}
In our example this gives us:
(48) IEA(S) = A−{♦p,♦q}= {♦(p∧q)}
The result so far is that exhaustifying ♦(p∨ q) with respect to its alternatives A
delivers the exclusive inference ¬♦(p∧q):
(49) ExhA(♦(p∨q)) = ♦(p∨q) & ¬♦(p∧q)
Consider now the recursively-exhaustified Exh(ExhA♦(p∨ q)). The outer Exh
takes a clausal argument of the form ExhAS, and because of our assumptions about
alternative sentences, the alternatives to ExhAS should be of the form ExhAS′, where
S′ is the result of changing the scalar items in S. In our examples the item of concern
is disjunction, so the alternatives to ExhA♦(p∨q) are those in A′ below.
(50) A′ = {ExhA♦p, ExhA♦q, ExhA♦(p∧q)}
The members of set A′ mean, respectively, that p is permitted but not q, that q is
permitted but not p, and that p,q are permitted. Now, to determine the value of
ExhA′(ExhA♦(p∨q)), we need to find from A′ the innocently-excludable alternatives
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to the sentence S′ = ExhA♦(p∨q). As stated earlier, we do this by subtracting from
A′ the non-innocent sets, i.e., the (minimal) sets whose negations contradict S′.
But in this case there aren’t any. Negating all elements of A′ is consistent with
ExhA♦(p∨q), as the reader may verify by checking the final line in (52), the value
of A′¬, next to (49), the value of ExhA♦(p∨q).
(51) A′ = {ExhA♦p, ExhA♦q, ExhA♦(p∧q)}
= {♦p&¬♦q, ♦q&¬♦p, ♦(p∧q)}
(52) A′¬ =
∧{¬(♦p&¬♦q), ¬(♦q&¬♦p), ¬♦(p∧q)}
=
∧{(♦p→ ♦q), (♦q→ ♦p), ¬♦(p∧q)}
= (♦p↔ ♦q) & ¬♦(p∧q)
Because A′¬ is compatible with ExhA♦(p∨ q), there are no non-innocent sets to
be removed from A′ in determining the IE-alternatives. In other words, the IE-
alternatives from A′, w.r.t. ExhA♦(p∨q), are exactly the elements of A′ itself. This
means that the outer Exh in ExhA′(ExhA♦(p∨q)) will conjoin its clausal argument
ExhA♦(p∨q) with the negations of all elements of A′. This produces FC:
(53) ExhA′(ExhA♦(p∨q)) = ExhA(♦(p∨q)) & (52)
= ExhA(♦(p∨q)) & (♦p↔ ♦q) & ¬♦(p∧q)
= ♦(p∨q) & ¬♦(p∧q) & (♦p↔ ♦q) & ¬♦(p∧q)
= ♦p & ♦q & ¬♦(p∧q)
Let us apply the same derivation to the unembedded p∨q. We will see that here the
exclusive inference derived from negating the conjunctive alternative, p∧q, blocks
the individuated derivations of p and of q, thus preventing the incorrect FC-like
inference from arising. First, assuming the alternatives in A below, the value of
singly-exhaustifying p∨q, given A, produces only the negation of p∧q:
(54) A = {p,q, p∧q}
(55) IEA(p∨q) = A−{p,q}= {p∧q}
(56) ExhA(p∨q) = p∨q & ∧{¬S′ : S′∈ IEA(p∨q)} = p∨q & ¬(p∧q)
Now consider ExhA′(ExhA(p∨q)). The contents of A′, following the same recipe
used earlier, are shown below together with their meanings.
(57) A′ = {ExhA p, ExhAq, ExhA(p∧q)}= {(p&¬q), (q&¬p), (p∧q)}
Of these alternatives, only the third is innocently-excludable w.r.t. the sentential
argument ExhA(p∨q). The reason is that ExhA p and ExhAq form a non-innocent set
by themselves, because their negations are together equivalent to the biconditional
p↔ q, and p↔ q contradicts ExhA(p∨q) (i.e., (56)). So, exhaustifying ExhA(p∨q)
does not negate all of the elements in A′; it only negates the (exhaustified) conjunctive
alternative, which is already part of the meaning of ExhA(p∨q):
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(58) IEA′(ExhA(p∨q)) = A′−{ExhA p, ExhAq}= {ExhA(p∧q)}
(59) ExhA′(ExhA(p∨q)) = ExhA(p∨q) &
∧{¬S′ : S′∈(58)}
= ExhA(p∨q) & ¬ExhA(p∧q)
= ExhA(p∨q) & ¬(p∧q) = (p∨q) & ¬(p∧q)
As a final example, we show the result of singly-exhaustifying (p∨q), and leave it
to the reader to confirm that further applications of Exh produce no further inferences:
(60) Exh{p,q,(p∧q)}((p∨q)) =(p∨q) &
∧{¬S : S∈(61)}
=(p∨q) & ¬p & ¬q& ¬(p∧q)
 (p∨q) & ♦p & ♦q
(61) IE{p,q,(p∧q)}((p∨q)) = {p, q, (p∧q)}
4.3 Recursive exhaustification and (anti)AE-licensers
In the first three sections of this paper we saw that ♦ˇ/ˇ entail actuality, and that
¬♦ˇ/¬ˇ entail anti-actuality. Now we will see how these two properties interact
with the exhaustification mechanism described above. Let us start with the universal
AE-licenser. While both p and q are innocently excludable w.r.t. (p∨q), the
same is not true of ˇp, ˇq and ˇ(p∨q); negating ˇp and ˇq entails the anti-AEs
¬p and ¬q, and these jointly contradict p∨ q, which is the AE of the utterance
ˇ(p∨q). The set {ˇp, ˇq} is therefore non-innocent w.r.t. ˇ(p∨q), giving us the
IE alternatives in (62), and the FC-less exhaustification in (63):
(62) IE{ˇp, ˇq, ˇ(p∧q)}(ˇ(p∨q)) = {ˇp, ˇq, ˇ(p∧q)}−{ˇp,ˇq}
= {ˇ(p∧q)}
(63) Exh{ˇp, ˇq, ˇ(p∧q)}(ˇ(p∨q)) = ˇ(p∨q) & ¬ˇ(p∧q)
 p∨q & ¬(p∧q)
Notice that the mechanism produces neither FC nor the negation of FC. We therefore
expect ˇ(p∨ q) to be compatible with FC, even if the inference is not deducible
from the sentence. This matches the judgement reported in section 4.1.
The reader will likely notice that this result parallels the result of exhaustifying
p∨ q, where the conflict between ¬p/¬q and p∨ q renders the disjuncts non-
innocent. In (62) the same conflict arises, but it does so through the anti-AEs of
¬ˇp/¬ˇq and the AE of ˇ(p∨q).
(Anti-)AEs also prevent double-exhaustification from producing FC in the case
of ♦ˇ(p∨ q), again in parallel to the case of p∨ q, whose double-exhaustification
produces no FC-like inferences.
(64) Let A = {♦ˇp, ♦ˇq, ♦ˇ(p∧q)}. Then:
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a. IEA(♦ˇ(p∨q)) = A−{♦ˇp, ♦ˇq}= {♦ˇ(p∧q)}
b. ExhA(♦ˇ(p∨q)) = ♦ˇ(p∨q) & ¬♦ˇ(p∧q) ( p∨q & ¬(p∧q))
Now, let A′ = {ExhA♦ˇp, ExhA♦ˇq, ExhA♦ˇ(p∧q)}. Then:
(65) IEA′(ExhA♦ˇ(p∨q)) = A′−{ExhA♦ˇp,ExhA♦ˇq}= {ExhA♦ˇ(p∧q)}
ExhA♦ˇp and ExhA♦ˇq are non-innocent because their joint negation comes to mean
♦ˇp↔ ♦ˇq. This biconditional is met either when ♦ˇp and ♦ˇq are true, which entails
p,q and therefore contradicts the exclusive inference in (64b), or when ♦ˇp and
♦ˇq are false, which entails ¬p, ¬q and contradicts the disjunction in (64b). The
conjunctive ExhA(♦ˇ(p∧q)) is therefore the only IE-alternative for the upper Exh:
(66) ExhA′(ExhA(♦ˇ(p∨q))) = ExhA(♦ˇ(p∨q)) & ¬ExhA(♦ˇ(p∧q))
5 Conclusion and further issues
This paper described a connection between (anti-)AEs, and the inability of their
licensers to imply Free Choice inferences. The connection is transparent in an
implicature-based perspective of FC: deriving FC as an implicature hinges on negat-
ing excludable alternatives. In the case of(p∨q) these are the alternativesp,q,
and in the case of ♦(p∨q) they are the ‘pre-exhaustified’ Exh♦p, Exh♦q. But when
the relevant modal expression licenses (anti-)AEs, as in ˇ/♦ˇ(p∨ q), none of the
analogous alternatives are excludable, because of the interaction between their anti-
AEs with the AEs of the uttered expressions. Exhaustification in these cases fails to
generate FC inferences, as desired, but stops short of negating FC, also as desired.
There is more work to be done. I focused on two aspects of ♦ˇ/ˇ—anti-AEs
and FC-blocking—but I left out a third. Imagine that John, because of a medical
condition, is given permission to smoke marijuana. Imagine also that John is
forbidden from smoking tobacco. Now suppose that John actually smoked tobacco.
Then it is true that John smoked, and it is also true that John was given permission
to smoke. Yet it is infelicitous in this (Gettier-like) scenario to say that John ♦ˇ-
smoked. From this we learn that ♦ˇ(p∨ q) cannot be satisfied in situations where
p happened but not q, and where q was permitted but not p. But nothing in our
analysis captures this. So, what amendment might we add to the semantics that could
solve this problem, and importantly, will the amendment bring with it a solution
to the FC-blocking puzzle? To see how these two issues might be related, recall
the proposal (discussed and dismissed in section 4.1) where disjunction takes scope
above ♦ˇ/ˇ: at LF, ♦ˇ(p∨q) takes the form ♦ˇp∨ ♦ˇq. On this story, the Gettier-like
problem (for disjunction) does not arise, and FC is arguably blocked. As I said
earlier, I do not think that this one idea is promising, but it is possible that something
like it might get around the Gettier issue, and explain FC-blocking on the way.
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